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1. Introduction 
 
It is routine in formal models to analyse the tax/subsidy competition between potential host 
countries for a foreign direct investment (FDI) project as an auction. Haufler and Wooton 
(1999) is an important early example of this approach. A generic feature of such auction-
based models is that, in equilibrium, the multinational enterprise (MNE) chooses the efficient 
location for its plant (where, as conventional, world welfare is the efficiency standard). Thus, 
popular concerns about the welfare economics of fiscal competition for FDI – e.g. the 
widespread fear that corporate tax rates and revenues would “race to the bottom” – are 
properly shown to be distributional rather than efficiency-related.
1
 
 
The valuation that a host country places on an inward FDI project depends on several factors: 
in particular, the number of jobs that will be created (if there is existing involuntary 
unemployment) and the wage premium offered by the MNE; and the impact on existing (or 
incumbent) firms within the host country, which may be positive due to localised 
technological spillovers or negative due to intensified product-market competition.
2
 For 
simplicity, the original Haufler/Wooton analysis assumed that the foreign MNE was the only 
firm in the industry, and thus overlooked the impact of inward FDI on incumbent firms’ 
profits. 
 
 
 
Subsequent auction models by Fumagalli (2003) and Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) extended the 
Haufler/Wooton framework by including incumbent firms in one or both host countries. 
Under the assumption that incumbent firms are locally owned, these extensions confirmed 
that the MNE’s equilibrium location remains efficient.
3
 In this paper, our purpose is to relax 
the assumption of local ownership of incumbents. In particular, we investigate whether the 
                                                             
1
 During the late 1990s, these public concerns were reflected at the policy level when both the European Union 
and the OECD launched initiatives to combat “harmful” tax competition (European Commission, 1997; OECD, 
1998). 
2
 UNCTAD (2003, p. 88) cites “crowding out of local firms” as a major host‐country concern in relation to 
inward FDI. 
3
 e.g. Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), Proposition 5. 
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efficiency property of equilibrium survives this generalisation. We focus on the fiscal 
competition between two potential host countries, which together form a regional product 
market, for an MNE’s production plant. Both host countries contain pre-established, 
incumbent firms, whose profits are affected by inward FDI, and we allow the ownership of 
any given incumbent firm to be spread throughout the two host countries and the rest of the 
world. 
 
For the MNE to choose an inefficient location in the equilibrium of our fiscal competition 
game, it is necessary that some share of the incumbent stock of firms in the host region is 
owned in the rest of the world. (Thus, the assumption of local ownership of incumbents is 
crucial to previous efficiency results.) The data in Figure 1 show that this necessary condition 
is surely satisfied in the case of three large European countries, where, for example, around 
50% of equity in UK companies was, in recent years, owned in countries outside the EU-15.
4
 
More generally, for an inefficient equilibrium location, it is necessary that the externality that 
inward FDI imposes on incumbent-firm owners in the rest of the world (through changes in 
their profit income) differs between the two host countries. Such a difference will tend to 
arise when the share of rest-of-world ownership of incumbents differs markedly, as between 
the UK and Germany/France in Figure 1. 
 
While the efficient plant location is unaffected by changes in the international distribution of 
firm ownership, its equilibrium location does vary. If inward FDI harms incumbents by 
intensifying competition, then a rise in the share of a country’s incumbent firms that is owned 
outside the host region makes that country more likely to win the competition for new FDI. 
(The negative effect of inward FDI on incumbent firms owned in third countries is given no 
weight by the competing countries.) Thus, the inefficient location might well win the MNE’s 
plant in equilibrium if the bulk of its incumbent firms are owned in the rest of the world. 
 
The paper that is closest to ours is Mittermaier (2009), who studies the fiscal competition for 
a new FDI project between two potential host countries, both of whom contain a single 
incumbent firm. Each incumbent firm is wholly owned either domestically or outside the host 
region, and product-market competition is Cournot. Our paper generalises Mittermaier’s 
model and complements his exclusively positive analysis by considering the efficiency 
properties of equilibrium.
5
 Our result in Proposition 2(i) on the influence of incumbent-firm 
ownership on the outcome of contests for new FDI is consistent with Mittermaier’s findings. 
 
2. A model of subsidy competition for FDI 
 
For ease of comparison with existing results, we use a modelling structure that is familiar 
from the literature (e.g. Haufler and Wooton, 1999; Fumagalli, 2003; Bjorvatn and Eckel, 
2006). Two potential host countries, A and B, are competing in lump-sum FDI subsidies for a 
                                                             
4
 The data are taken from the IMF's Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (http://cdis.imf.org). Strictly 
speaking, for the purposes of our model below, we should distinguish between the profits of firms in the UK 
and the global profits of UK firms, but this is impossible in the data. 
5
 Specifically, the generalisations we incorporate are: (i) no restrictions are placed on the total number of 
incumbent firms within the host region or on their distribution between the two bidding countries; (ii) 
“ownership” in our model is a continuous variable and we allow incumbent‐firm ownership to be distributed in 
arbitrary proportions across the two bidding countries and the rest of the world; (iii) our model accommodates 
the possibility that inward FDI might affect incumbent firms through technological spillovers as well as through 
product‐market competition; and (iv) we do not restrict the source of social benefits from inward FDI to 
consumer‐surplus gains. 
  
single MNE’s production plant. We assume that the MNE is entirely owned in the rest of the 
world (RoW) and that it cannot export to the host region from its home plant in RoW due to 
prohibitive trade costs.
6
 Together, A and B comprise the “host region”, and we assume that 
the MNE will establish at most one plant in the region to serve the entire regional market, 
perhaps due to economies of scale. In both A and B, there are incumbent firms whose profits 
may be affected by inward FDI but who are immobile with respect to the subsidy competition 
under analysis. We denote the MNE’s pre-subsidy profits following location in country i by 
�!. 
 
The fiscal competition game has two stages, and we solve it backwards to isolate its subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In the first stage, both countries simultaneously 
announce their bids for the MNE’s plant. Each country aims to maximise its social welfare 
and will thus bid at most its “valuation”, �!, where 
 
�! ≡ �! + �!!Π! − �!"Π! 
�! ≡ �! − �!"Π! + �!!Π! 
 
�! is the maximum subsidy that country i is prepared to pay to lure the MNE away from its 
regional partner. �! measures the “social benefits” that country i enjoys from inward FDI over 
importing. For example, inward FDI might relieve involuntary unemployment or be 
associated with a wage premium for workers (relative to incumbent firms in the host 
country).
7,8
 Π! is the change in the total profits of pre-established, incumbent firms in country 
i if the MNE locates its plant in i rather than j. If inward FDI increases competitive pressure 
in the host country (perhaps because it allows the MNE to jump over an intra-regional trade 
cost), then we would expect Π! < 0. Alternatively, if, for example, incumbent firms would 
feel little extra competitive pressure from inward FDI but would instead enjoy localised 
technology spillovers from the MNE, then  Π! > 0. �!" ∈ 0,1  measures the share of profits 
from incumbent firms in country i that accrues to owners in country j.
9
 Thus, when 
determining its valuation, a country takes account of how relocation (between A and B) by the 
MNE would affect the profit income its citizens earn from incumbent firms in both countries. 
 
We also define the following ownership shares that will be used below: 
 
�! ≡ �!! + �!" 
�! ≡ �!" + �!! 
 
                                                             
6
 Following Ferrett and Wooton (2010), we do not expect the assumption on the MNE’s ownership to be 
restrictive. 
7
 Of course, it might be the case, as in Ireland during the 1990s when inward FDI boomed (Alfaro et al., 2005), 
that MNE entry drives up the industry‐wide wage. In this case, when accounting for social welfare, the loss to 
domestically‐owned firms must be offset against the wage gain to workers. Our model, which explicitly 
accounts for changes in incumbent‐firm profits, is well‐equipped to handle this scenario. 
8
 However, we could have �! < 0 if, for example, inward FDI were associated with severe localised pollution 
externalities. 
9
 Typically, there will be a heterogeneous collection of incumbent firms in country A, and the citizens of 
country A will own different shares of each one. The aggregate approach to accounting for profit income that 
we adopt in our VA expression can thus be justified either by assuming that the citizens of A collectively own 
the same share of each incumbent firm in A (which is then given by eAA) or by assuming that every incumbent 
firm in A experiences the same change in its profits following inward FDI (in this case, eAA is the mean across 
incumbents). 
  
�! is the share of profits from incumbent firms in country i that remains within the host 
region. Thus, a share 1− �! flows to owners in RoW. 
 
In the second stage of our game, the MNE chooses where to locate its plant, choosing 
between A, B, and “stay out”. Under “stay out” the MNE earns zero, whereas in A or B the 
MNE earns �! plus the bid of the country concerned. For both countries, we assume that the 
maximum level of post-subsidy profits that might be offered to the MNE (�! + �! ≥ 0) is 
positive, and that local production with a corporate tax of �! is preferred to no FDI flows into 
the region. The former assumption means that A and B will be prepared to actively compete 
against each other for the inward FDI, while the latter assumption means that the equilibrium 
bids are unique.
10
 
 
2.1. Equilibrium location 
 
The equilibrium takes a form that is familiar, for example, from Haufler and Wooton (1999). 
The fiscal competition is a first-price auction with an important wrinkle: the firm’s location is 
not determined by the countries’ subsidy offers alone. Rather, the plant goes to the country 
that offers the higher level of post-subsidy profits. As Haufler and Wooton (1999) point out, 
this means that an inherently profitable (high π) country, which offers higher pre-subsidy 
profits than the other location, can offer a lower FDI subsidy than its rivals, or perhaps even 
announce a corporate tax, and still win the plant. 
 
To determine the MNE’s equilibrium location, we compare its post-subsidy profits in A and B 
when the countries offer their valuations as subsidies. Therefore, country A is the equilibrium 
location if and only if 
 
�! + �! ≥ �! + �!          (1) 
 
In this equilibrium, country B offers its maximum subsidy of �!, and A offers a subsidy of 
�! + �! − �! + �, where � is vanishingly small, and wins the FDI. 
 
Expanding the equilibrium condition (1), country A wins the FDI if and only if 
 
∆!≡ ∆! + �!Π! − �!Π! ≥ 0,        (2) 
 
where ∆!≡ �! + �! − �! + �!  measures the “FDI advantage” of country A in terms of 
social benefits and MNE profits.
11
 ∆! is the difference between the maximum levels of post-
subsidy profits that the two host countries are willing to offer the MNE. 
 
2.2. Efficient location 
 
The efficient location for the MNE’s plant is the one that maximises world welfare. World 
welfare is higher when the MNE locates in A rather than B if and only if 
 
                                                             
10
 These two assumptions ensure that the countries’ reaction functions in bid space resemble those in figure 1 
of Ferrett and Wooton (2010). (Two equilibria might arise if inward FDI were associated with severe region‐
wide pollution. In this case, country A might optimally choose to attract the plant if the MNE prefers B to “stay 
out”, while it might optimally choose not to do so if the MNE prefers “stay out” to B.) 
11
 Without incumbent firms, the sign of ∆! determines the MNE’s equilibrium location. 
  
∆!≡ ∆! + Π! − Π! ≥ 0,         (3) 
 
where ∆! measures the gain in world welfare if the MNE chooses A over B. Note that the 
efficient location is independent of how the ownership of the incumbent firms is distributed 
internationally because efficiency is based on aggregate world welfare. 
 
2.3. Results 
 
From (2) and (3), the MNE’s equilibrium location is efficient if and only if ∆! and ∆! have 
the same sign. 
 
Proposition 1: Either of the following two conditions is sufficient for the MNE’s equilibrium 
location to be efficient: (i) 1− �! �! = 1− �! �!, so the FDI-induced change in the flow 
of profit income from incumbent firms to owners in RoW is the same for both host countries; 
(ii) �!  is “large”, because the sum of wider social benefits from FDI (Si) and profits of the 
MNE (πi) differs significantly between the two host countries. Therefore, for the MNE’s 
equilibrium location to be inefficient, it is necessary that (i) and (ii) both fail. 
 
Proof: Part (i) uses the fact that ∆!= ∆! is sufficient for ��� ∆! = ��� ∆! . Part (ii) is 
straightforward. 
 
From Proposition 1(i) it follows immediately that the equilibrium location is always efficient 
if the incumbent firms are entirely owned within the host region, i.e. if �! = �! = 1. This is 
the case that dominates the existing literature (e.g. Fumagalli, 2003; Bjorvatn and Eckel, 
2006). More generally, the condition in Proposition 1(i) requires that the externality from 
inward FDI on incumbent-firm owners in RoW be the same for both potential host countries. 
 
To understand Proposition 1(ii), note that a large asymmetry between the host countries in 
terms of combined social benefits from FDI and MNE profits is not, in itself, a source of 
inefficiency (Haufler and Wooton, 1999). Thus, such an asymmetry can, if large enough, 
outweigh any difference between the host countries in how inward FDI affects profit flows 
from incumbent firms to RoW. To interpret the condition on Δ! , note that if countries A and 
B are very similar, then Δ!  will be small. Thus, some asymmetry between A and B is needed 
for “large” Δ! : e.g. one of the countries might have a large surplus supply of labour, making 
inward FDI both highly profitable and highly socially beneficial. 
 
To focus on cases where the MNE’s location might be inefficient, we now assume ∆!= 0, so 
that Proposition 1(ii) does not apply. We also assume that Π! < 0 for � ∈ �,�  so that 
inward investment harms incumbent firms (e.g. the competition effect of inward FDI 
outweighs the spillover effect). This is consistent with the empirical evidence surveyed in 
Görg and Greenaway (2004). It is straightforward to modify our following arguments to cases 
where this simplifying assumption fails.
12
 Finally, we assume that Π! = �Π!, where 
� ∈ (0,1) can be interpreted as a measure of the relative size of country B.13 This assumption 
                                                             
12
 E.g. if Π! > 0 for � ∈ �,� , then “falls” becomes “rises” in Proposition 2(i). 
13
 This interpretation of k (as a measure of the relative size of country B) can be micro‐founded in the following 
canonical case: each country contains a fixed number of incumbent firms (aside from the MNE, there is no 
entry into, or exit from, the industry); the good is homogeneous and competition is Cournot; and all firms have 
zero unit cost. In a Technical Supplement to our paper (available from the authors on request), we explicitly 
solve this standard case, and we show that as the relative number of households in country B rises, Π! Π! 
also rises. 
  
can always be satisfied through suitable labelling of the two host countries and is thus not 
restrictive. 
 
Figure 2: Equilibrium versus efficient locations 
(The efficient location is B throughout the figure.) 
 
 
Our assumptions ∆!= 0 and 0 > Π! > Π! together imply, from (3), that country B is the 
efficient location because the negative impact of inward FDI on incumbent firms is smaller 
there. Therefore, from (2), the MNE’s equilibrium location is efficient if and only if ∆!< 0 or 
�! > ��!, so that B wins the competition for FDI. In Figure 2 we explore the efficiency 
properties of the equilibrium in (�!, �!)-space. 
 
A key observation from Figure 2 is that, for both � ∈ �,� , a rise in �! makes it less likely 
that country i is the equilibrium location. For example, eA might rise due to an increase in 
either eAA or eAB, both of which make it less likely that A wins the competition for the FDI. A 
rise in eAA cuts VA: country A becomes less willing to bid for the MNE because it takes greater 
account of the harm that inward FDI does to the incumbent firms already in A. On the other 
hand, a rise in eAB increases VB: country B becomes more willing to bid for the MNE, in order 
to reduce the harm to incumbents in A.
14
 
 
If country B grows in relative size, i.e. k rises, then the area where A is the (inefficient) 
equilibrium grows. Intuitively, a rise in k has the same effect as a rise in eB, because they 
enter the condition for the countries to tie in equilibrium (�! = ��!) multiplicatively: country 
A becomes more willing to bid for the FDI and B less willing, thus making country A more 
likely to win the competition. 
 
Proposition 2 summarises the analysis of Figure 2. 
 
                                                             
14
 It is worth noting that changes in the distribution of incumbent‐firm ownership will typically affect 
governments’ incentives to engage in other policies besides corporate taxes/subsidies. See, for example, 
Blanchard (2010), who examines the relationships between cross‐border firm ownership and trade policy. 
1 
1 
�!  
�! 
Equilibrium location 
(B) is efficient 
Equilibrium location 
(A) is inefficient  
�! = ��!  
  
Proposition 2: Assume that inward FDI harms incumbent firms. (i) A country becomes more 
likely to win the competition for new FDI as: the share of its incumbent stock of firms owned 
within the host region falls; and its relative size falls. (ii) Therefore, the efficient location is 
more likely to win the competition, the higher is the RoW ownership share of the efficient 
location’s stock of incumbent firms. 
 
We developed Proposition 2 under the assumption that ∆!= 0. However, this condition can 
be relaxed. In general, B is the equilibrium location if and only if �! > ��! − Δ! Π! . Thus, 
given Π! < 0, ∆!< 0 would shift the inter-regional boundary in Figure 2 downwards, making 
country B more likely to win the competition as its combined social benefits from FDI and 
MNE profits increase.
15
 Moreover, the assumption in Proposition 2 that inward FDI harms 
incumbents can also be relaxed. If, on the contrary, inward FDI benefits incumbents (perhaps 
through strong localised technological spillovers), then a country will become more likely to 
win the competition for new FDI as the share of its incumbent stock of firms owned within 
the host region rises, in contrast to part (i) of Proposition 2. Thus, if FDI inflows are subject 
to fiscal competition, our analysis suggests that whether the industry-level relationship 
between a country’s FDI inflow and the host region’s incumbent-firm ownership share is 
positive or negative will depend crucially on how inward FDI affects incumbents. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we show that the distribution of ownership of the existing (or incumbent) stock 
of firms within a host region matters for the efficiency of the fiscal competition for a new 
FDI project. This contrasts with the results in Ferrett and Wooton (2010), who show that the 
outcome of the fiscal competition is independent of the geographic distribution of the 
incoming MNE’s ownership. 
 
For the MNE to choose the inefficient location in equilibrium, it is necessary that the 
externality that inward FDI imposes on incumbent-firm owners in the rest of the world 
(RoW), through changes in their profit income, differs between the two host countries. Thus, 
the assumption that incumbent firms are locally owned is crucial to efficiency results in 
previous papers (e.g. Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006). 
 
Moreover, despite reported host-country concerns that inward FDI might lead to “crowding 
out of local firms” (UNCTAD, 2003, p. 88), we show that the distribution of incumbent-firm 
ownership is the more serious issue as far as efficiency (world welfare) is concerned. For 
example, if all incumbents are locally owned, then fiscal competition for new FDI will 
produce an efficient plant location – even if inward FDI harms incumbents through 
intensified competition. However, as the share of RoW ownership of incumbent firms in the 
losing country grows, it becomes more likely that the MNE’s plant will be sited in that, 
inefficient, location. 
 
We have assumed throughout that the incumbent firms in the two host countries are immobile 
with respect to the fiscal competition under analysis. Relaxing this assumption by 
endogenising the locations of firms other than the incoming MNE is a topic for future 
research. 
 
  
                                                             
15
 Note that B remains the efficient location with ΔA<0. 
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Technical Supplement for Ferrett and Hoefele, “On the efficiency of fiscal 
competition for FDI when incumbent firms are foreign-owned” 
 
Relative country size and the profit effects of inward FDI 
 
In the second half of our paper (leading up to Proposition 2), we assume that Π! Π!, 
which we term k, can be interpreted as a measure of the relative size of country B. 
(Recall that Π! is the change in the total profits of incumbent firms in country i if the 
MNE locates its plant in i rather than j.) The purpose of this Technical Supplement is 
to show that this assumption is valid in the following standard case: 
 
• All firms produce a homogeneous good at zero cost and compete à la 
Cournot. 
• Households everywhere are identical: country A contains 1 household (e.g. 1 
million), and country B contains ℎ ∈ 0,1  households. Thus, h is the direct 
measure of B’s relative size. 
• There are 𝑛! + 𝑛! incumbent firms in total, of which nA are located in A and nB 
in B. (Thus, including the MNE, there are 𝑛! + 𝑛! + 1 firms.) 
• Household demand is given by 1-(price). Thus, aggregate demand in B is ℎ 1− 𝑝! . 
• The trade cost is t, and we assume that it is non-prohibitive (so all Cournot 
equilibria are interior). 
 
We begin with the incumbents’ Cournot-equilibrium quantities. Let 𝑞!!"#$%&'(  and 𝑞!!"#$%& denote, respectively, the domestic and export sales of an incumbent firm in 
country i. If the MNE locates in country A, these are 
 𝑞!!"#$%&'( = 1+ 𝑛!𝑡𝑛! + 𝑛! + 2 ;   𝑞!!"#$%& = 1− (𝑛! + 1)𝑡𝑛! + 𝑛! + 2  
 𝑞!!"#$%&'( = 1+ (𝑛! + 1)𝑡𝑛! + 𝑛! + 2 ;   𝑞!!"#$%& = 1− (𝑛! + 2)𝑡𝑛! + 𝑛! + 2 . 
 
While if the MNE locates in B, they are 
 𝑞!!"#$%&'( = 1+ (𝑛! + 1)𝑡𝑛! + 𝑛! + 2 ;   𝑞!!"#$%& = 1− (𝑛! + 2)𝑡𝑛! + 𝑛! + 2  
 𝑞!!"#$%&'( = 1+ 𝑛!𝑡𝑛! + 𝑛! + 2 ;   𝑞!!"#$%& = 1− (𝑛! + 1)𝑡𝑛! + 𝑛! + 2 . 
 
Thus, the inward-FDI-induced changes in total incumbent-firm profits are 
 Π! = 𝑛!𝑛! + 𝑛! + 2 ! ∙ 1+ 𝑛!𝑡 ! + ℎ 1− 𝑛! + 1 𝑡 !− 1+ 𝑛! + 1 𝑡 ! − ℎ 1− 𝑛! + 2 𝑡 !  
 Π! = 𝑛!𝑛! + 𝑛! + 2 ! ∙ 1− 𝑛! + 1 𝑡 ! + ℎ 1+ 𝑛!𝑡 !− 1− 𝑛! + 2 𝑡 ! − ℎ 1+ 𝑛! + 1 𝑡 !  
2 
 
 
The ratio is 
 
𝑘 = Π!Π! = 𝑛!𝑛! ∙
1− 𝑛! + 1 𝑡 ! + ℎ 1+ 𝑛!𝑡 !− 1− 𝑛! + 2 𝑡 ! − ℎ 1+ 𝑛! + 1 𝑡 !1+ 𝑛!𝑡 ! + ℎ 1− 𝑛! + 1 𝑡 !− 1+ 𝑛! + 1 𝑡 ! − ℎ 1− 𝑛! + 2 𝑡 !  
 
or 
 𝑘 = 𝑛!𝑛! ∙ Γ! + hΓ!hΓ! + Γ!   
 
To interpret k as a measure of the relative size of country B (i.e. of h), we require 𝜕𝑘 𝜕ℎ > 0 or Γ!Γ! > Γ!Γ!. We next prove that this inequality does indeed hold. 
 
Proof that 𝚪𝟐𝚪𝟒 > 𝚪𝟏𝚪𝟑: 
 
First, note that Γ! < 0  and Γ! < 0, which implies that their product is positive. It is 
therefore sufficient to show that Γ! > Γ!  and Γ! > Γ!  for Γ!Γ! > Γ!Γ! to hold. 
 
Second, Γ! > Γ!  becomes 
 1+ 𝑛!𝑡 ! − 1+ 𝑛! + 1 𝑡 ! > 1− 𝑛! + 1 𝑡 ! −    1− 𝑛! + 2 𝑡 !  
 −2 1+ 𝑛!𝑡 − 𝑡! > 2 1+ 𝑛!𝑡 − 𝑡!  
 
Noting that the right-hand side is always positive1 and multiplying the left-hand side 
by minus one (to recover the absolute value) yields 
 2 1+ 𝑛!𝑡 + 𝑡! > 2 1+ 𝑛!𝑡 − 𝑡! 
 
Isolating the t’s yields 
 (2𝑛! + 1)𝑡 + 𝑡! > 0 
 
which always holds. The demonstration that Γ! > Γ!  follows the same steps (with 𝑛! replacing 𝑛! in the inequalities above). This proves that Γ!Γ! > Γ!Γ! and, therefore, 
that 𝜕𝑘 𝜕ℎ > 0 – so k can indeed be interpreted as a measure of the relative size of 
country B in the standard linear Cournot case. 
 
As an illustration, the plot below shows 𝑘 = Π! Π!  against h for nA=5, nB=3 and 
t=0.1. This confirms that k is monotonically increasing in h.2 
 
                                            
1 1 − 𝑛! + 1 𝑡 ! −    1 − 𝑛! + 2 𝑡 ! > 0  ⇔ − 𝑛! + 1 𝑡   >   − 𝑛! + 2 𝑡  ⇔ 𝑛! + 1   <    𝑛! + 2 . 
2 One point to note is that if h is very small, then we get Π! > 0 (and hence Π! Π! negative), despite 
the fact that there are no technological spillovers from inward FDI. This arises because when B is very 
small, incumbent firms in B prefer the MNE to locate in B rather than A – and to thereby reduce 
competition on their much larger export market. 
3 
 
 
